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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
APPEAL AND ERROR-CO-PARTIES---WHETHER OR NOT UNDER
THE CIVIL PRACTICE ACT NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE SERVED
UPON DEFAULTED PARTIES.-In Lewis v. Renfro,' a defaulted de-

fendant filed a motion to dismiss the piantiff's appeal from a
decree entered in favor of the defendants on a bill in equity, and
the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District held that the
motion should be sustained under rule 342 of the Supreme Court
Rules. The court stated: "The Civil Practice Act has broadened
the scope of causes of actions and controversies between parties

that may be litigated in a single suit and provides that all
methods of review theretofore existing

shall be by notice of

appeal. In view of this provision, it would seem that all parties
even though defaulted should be considered as parties to the
record requiring notice of appeal, until all matters involved are

finally adjudicated by a court of review."
Section 79 of the Civil Practice Act 3 authorizes the Supreme
1 291 Ill. App. 396, 9 N. E. (2d) 652 (1937).
2 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat., 1937, Ch. 110, § 259.34. "(1) A copy of the
notice by which the appeal is perfected shall be served upon each appellee
and upon any co-party who does not appear as appellant.
3 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat., 1937, Ch. 110, § 203.
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Court to pass rules prescribing the manner of giving notice and
it is well established in Illinois that such rules have the force of
law. 4 In this instance, the Supreme Court Rule prescribed that
notice of appeal should be served upon each appellee and any coparty who does not appear as appellant. It must be noted that this
is different from the usual statutory provision in other states which
provides for the service of notice upon "adverse parties." Under
such statutes it is generally held that an adverse party entitled5
to notice should also have appeared in the action or suit.
Such a holding thereon is certainly not authority for a like construction of the Illinois Act, the language of which appears to
be inclusive enough to support the construction given it by the
court in this case. However, such a construction is hardly justi6
fied under section 4 of the Act
and would seem to be too techni7
cal to be rationally upheld.
G. 0. HEBEL
CONFLICTS OF LAWS-CONTRACTS--WHETHER
TRACT TO WHICH A SOVEREIGN IS A PARTY Is

OR NOT A CON-

GOVERNED BY THE

LAW OF THE SOVEREIGN.-In its decision in the case of The King
v. International Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders
Aktiengesellschaft' the English House of Lords decided that the
law of the United States should be applied in construing the
terms of the bond indenture under which British Government
5 per cent Gold Notes of 1917 were offered in New York to
investors. The case arose by reason of the Joint Resolution of
Congress 2 which made strict compliance with the gold clause of
the indenture uninforcible under both United States and English
law.3
The holders of the gold bonds, into which the Notes of 1917
had been converted and which were covered by the same inden4 Bender v. Alton Ry. Co., 284 11. App. 419, 1 N. E. (2d) 108 (1936);
People v. Callopy, 358 Ill. 11, 192 N. E. 634 (1934).
5 Heider v. Unicume, 142 Or. 410, 14 P. (2d) 456 (1932) ; Colwell v.
Union Central Life Ins. Co., 59 N. D. 768, 232 N. W. 10 (1930) ; Champagne

v. Birnot, 143 Wash. 187, 254 P. 829 (1927).

See annotation in 88 A. L. R.

428, and cases there cited.
6 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat., 1937, Ch. 110, § 128, which provides that
the provisions of the act shall be liberally construed.
7 It may be noted that the instant case is to be appealed and that the
Appellate Court for the First District has refused to follow this decision,
upon the ground that it is too technical to be justified.
I [19371 A. C. 500.
2 U. S. C. A., Tit. 31, § 463.
S English courts do not enforce contracts, the performance of which is
forbidden by the law of theplace where it must be performed. Ralli Bros. v.
Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar, [1920] 2 K. B. 287.
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ture, were seeking a declaratory judgment from the English court
entitling them, in lieu of the actual gold payment specified in the
indenture, to payment of interest and principal thereon at the
equivalent of the gold coin required by the gold clause. The
indenture provided that bondholders with two optional modes of
payment, first, payment in New York in gold coin of the standard
of weight and fineness existing in February, 1917, or, second,
payment in London in sterling at a fixed rate of $4.861/ to
the pound. If the contract was construed according to United
States law, the Joint Resolution of Congress 4 would be effective
and a complete discharge of the indebtedness obtained by payOnent on the due dates of the par amount of principal and
interest by the then existing legal tender of the United States.
Application of the English law would, under the decision of Feist
v. Societe IntercommunaleBelge d' Electricite,5 require payment
in depreciated dollars equivalent to the gold payment specified
in the indenture.
The contract was entered into and payment was to be made
in New York. The indenture contained United States, rather
than English, characteristics and terminology.6 It was evident,
therefore, that, under the tests usually applied in such cases,
the law of the United States would control. Both the trial and
Court of Appeal courts held, however, that the English law
should govern. These decisions relied on the dictum of Lord
Romilly M. R. in Smith v. Weguelin7 to the effect that a sovereign
must intend in ail cases to have the validity of its acts or its
promises determined by its own laws. Since a sovereign can be
sued only with its consent and, therefore, only in courts of its
own choice, the argument is advanced that the sovereign must
conclusively be presumed to intend to have its contracts governed
by its own laws.
The House of Lords in overruling the lower courts on the point
of controlling law applied the usual tests to the contract admitting, however, that the fact that a sovereign is a party to the
contract is an additional factor for consideration. However, in
the instant case, since all the tests-the place of contracting, the
place of performance, and the intent of the parties-pointed to
the laws of the United States as the controlling law, such weight
as was given the fact of sovereignty was easily overcome.
4

U. S. C. A., Tit. 31, § 463.

5 [1934] A. C. 161.
6 Gold clauses are rarely found in English indentures; they are common
in United States indentures.
7 L. R. 8 Eq. 198 (1869).
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The decision by the House of Lords appears to be sound. The
argument that the contracts of a sovereign must in all cases be
governed by its own laws because its consent is essential to any
action thereon is not convincing in view of the fact that consent
is as much a requisite when the contract is wholly domestic as
when, under the laws applicable to a contract between private
individuals, the contract would be controlled by the laws of
another sovereign. Strictly speaking the acts of a sovereign
cannot be controlled by any law because the consent given to the
application of either domestic or foreign law may be revoked at
the will of the sovereign. Consequently, there does not appear to
be any distinction between the domestic and foreign contracts of
a sovereign on the ground of consent, and, since consent is the
ground on which contracts by sovereigns are distinguishable from
contracts between private individuals, it follows that the controlling law should be determined by the same tests in either case.
H. H. SIMPSON, JR.
CORPORATIONS -

FOREIGN CORPORATIONS

-

EFFECT OF INCORPO-

RATION IN ONE STATE UPON RIGHT To Do BusINEss SOLELY IN
1
ANOTHER STATE.-In Spivey v. Spivey Building Corporation,
a

corporation was organized in Delaware for the sole purpose of
acquiring, owning, and operating a building on a site in Illinois.
It complied with the foreign corporation laws and was duly
authorized to do business in Illinois. A building in East St. Louis
was conveyed to the corporation.
The heirs of the grantor and a tenant, the appellants, brought
a suit in ejectment on the theory that the corporation had no
authority to exercise any of its corporate powers in the state of
Delaware, and consequently never acquired a corporate existence.
They therefore contended that it would naturally follow that
there could be no corporate existence in Illinois.
The two cases relied upon by the appellants were not in point.
In both of them the corporations were precluded by their charters
from doing any business within the states of their creation,2
and in one instance the corporation was formed to do in a foreign
state that which was forbidden in the state of its creation.3
They could therefore achieve no legal existence.
1 367 Ill.
25, 10 N. E. (2d) 385 (1937).
2 Land Grant Railway and Trust Co. v. Board of Commissioners of
Coffey County, 6 Kan. 245 (1870).
3 Myatt v. Ponca City Land and Improvement Co., 14 Okla. 189, 78 P. 185

(1903).
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The court found that the acts performed by the corporation
in Illinois could have been consummated in its office in Delaware,
and that the corporation had a legal existence in the latter state.
A corporation may be legally organized to transact all of its
business outside the state of creation where it is permitted to
exercise some of its corporate powers in the state of its creation.4
It has been decided that the right to operate in the state of incorporation, even if unexercised, is sufficient to secure a right to
operate in another state provided such operation does not violate
the laws of the latter state and is not in excess of the charter
authority. 5 The main interest in the case is the temerity of the
appellants and the fact that the point has never been raised in
this state.
J. R. SCOTT
CRIMINAL

LAw-EVIDENCE-THIRD

PERsoN's

CONFESSION

OF

CRIME AS WITHIN HEARSAY RULE AND INADMISSIBLE TO PROVE

Newton v. State,' the
Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals refused to admit evidence
of a third party's extra judicial confession to the crime for which
defendant was being tried. The defendant, relying on an alibi,
showed that the declarant had been in a position to commit the
crime, had some of the loot in his possession, and had made several separate confessions. The declarant, shot resisting arrest,
was dead at the time of the trial. The court held these confessions inadmissible.
Since the declaration is made without the sanction of an oath,
it is hearsay. To make another exception would lead to great
abuses, it is said, because statements made outside of court are
2
not to be relied on. For this reason only, the evidence is rejected.
Shortly after the establishment of the hearsay rule, it became
customary to admit account entries of deceased persons charging
themselves with receipt of money; also, endorsements of payDEFENDANT INNOCENT OF SAME CRIME-In

4 Troy and North Carolina Gold Mining Co. v. Snow Lumber Co., 173
N. C. 593, L. R. A. 1917 E 892, 92 S. E. 494 (1917) ; Demarest v. Grant,

128 N. Y. 205, 28 N. E. 645 (1891) ; Missouri Lead Mining & Smelting Co.

v. Reinhard, 114 Mo. 218, 21 S. W. 488 (1893) ; Merrick v. Van Santvoord,
34 N. Y. 208 (1866).
5 Lancaster v. Amsterdam Improvement Co., 140 N. Y. 576, 24 L. R. A.
322, 35 N. E. 964 (1894) ; Second National Bank v. Hall, 35 Ohio St. 158
(1878) ; State ex rel. Godard v. Topeka Water Co., 61 Kan. 547, 60 P. 337
(1900); Moxie Nerve Food Co. v. Baumbach, 32 F. 205 (1887).
1 71 P. (2d) 122 (1937).
2 It should be observed that the rule in this case has nothing to do with
confessions of accomplices, dying declarations, or with declarations of third
persons within the res gestae or verbal act rules.
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ments, and oral declarations disparaging the declarant's title in
property. Experience and common sense indicated that when a
man said something against his own interests, he was probably
telling the truth; and by 1830 the exception was well settled,
without qualification, that all declarations of fact by deceased
persons against their own interests were admissible. They might
be disproved, but at least they could be considered.8
Then in 1844 the House of Lords decided the famous Sussex
Peerage Case4 and confined the exception to statements against
pecuniary or proprietary interests. No reason was suggested
then, nor since, why a man is more likely to lie and subject himself to hanging, than to lie and deprive himself of a dollar. In
fact, in several cases up to that time statements subjecting the
declarant to criminal liability had been received. 5
The Sussex Peerage case has been followed almost universally,
and is well established in the Federal courts and almost all the
states. But because it is wrong both historically and on principle,
the courts are asked again and again to reverse themselves.
Several have done so. In Hines v. Commonwealth, the Virginia
court allowed defendant to introduce the declaration for what it
was worth. In Texas that is the rule "where the case is one in
which the state is relying solely on circumstantial evidence, and
also where the guilt of said third party is inconsistent with the
guilt of the accused, and also where the facts show that the party
making the declaration was so situated that the crime might have
been committed by him." 7 In Brennan v. State8 the Maryland
court recognized the general rule, but because the guilt of the
third person was so clear, allowed the declaration to be introduced.
The leading case in the United States is Donnelly V. United
States.9 The rule of the Sussex Peerage case was adopted. Holmes
dissented, and two of the justices concurred with him. His opinion
states succinctly the objections to the rule, and it has been widely
quoted. "The rules of evidence in the main are based on
experience, logic, and common sense, less hampered by history
than some parts of the substantive law ... the exception to the
S For a complete history of the law of admissions see Wigmore on Evidence, (2d ed., 1932) III, 206, § 1476, from which this statement is taken.
4 11 Cl. & F. 85 (1844).

5 Hulet's Trial, 5 How. St. Tr. 1185 (1660) ; Standen v. Standen, Peake
45 (1791).
6 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843 (1923).
7 Wise v. State, 101 Tex. Cr. Rep. 58, 273 S.W. 850 (1925).
8 151 Md. 265, 134 A. 148 (1926).
9 228 U. S.243, 57 L. Ed. 820, 33 S.Ct. 449 (1913).
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hearsay rule in the case of declarations against interest is well
known; no other statement is so much against interest as a confession of murder. .... "
The danger that such admissions, if allowed in evidence, may
be fabricated can be guarded against by allowing the prosecution
to use all legitimate means of attacking the evidence after admission, as in any other case. Justice is more likely to be served
by a freer policy of admission at this point, than by any arbitrary
insistence upon an illogical rule created in the not so distant
past.'0
R. ROE
CRIMINAL LAW - FORMER JEOPARDY - PENDENCY OF APPEAL
FROM PRIOR CONVICTION AS VITIATING PLEA OF FORMER CONVIC-

TION.-The defendant was convicted in a prosecution for an assault with intent to kill one Genella Brewer. Before the trial had

begun, the defendant had filed a plea of former jeopardy based
on a conviction at a preceding term of court. From the latter
conviction the defendant appealed, and his appeal was pending
at the time he pleaded double jeopardy in the second case. The
Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals in Fay v. State' held that,
while an appeal was pending from the first conviction, a plea of

former conviction could not be sustained in a later case.
There is a paucity of authority on this precise point, appar2
ently the only cases in point being a line of Texas decisions
which includes SackHem v. Stat. 3 cited in. the Fay case, and one
case in a Federal court. 4 In the view of the Texas courts, the
pendency of a prior appeal would not make a subsequent prosecution for the same offense double jeopardy. The argument ad10 The very question has not been decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois, but its attitude may be indicated by Carlton v. People, 150 Ill. 181
(1894), in which a dictum declares positively that the confession of a third
person is inadmissible to show that such person is more likely guilty of the
crime than defendant.
1 71 P. (2d) 768 (Okla. Cr. App., 1937). While driving through a school
zone at an excessive rate of speed, Fay struck two children with his automobile. He was convicted of assault with intent to kill one of the children.
He contended that the prosecution as to the second child constituted double
jeopardy. The court decided that the incident involved two separate crimes;
hence, the decision that a plea of former conviction would not be supported
while an appeal was pending was unnecessary.
2 Allen v. State, 112 Tex. Cr. App. 448, 17 S. W. (2d) 49 (1929)
Eversole v. State, 106 Tex. Cr. App. 575, 294 S. W. 208 (1927) ; Sackhiem
v. State, 92 Tex. Cr. App. 437, 244 S. W. 377, 24 A. L. R. 1072 (1922) ;
Harvey v. State, 57 Tex. Cr. App. 2, 121 S. W. 501 (1909); Dupree v.
State, 56 Tex. Cr. App. 562, 120 S. W. 871, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 596 (1909).
3 92 Tex. Cr. App. 437, 244 S. W. 377 (1922).
4 United States v. Olsen, 57 F. 579 (1893).
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vanced in support of this holding is that the first judgment has
not become final at the time of the second prosecution, and since
the conviction may be reversed, the defendant is not deemed to
be twice subjected to jeopardy. 5 It is there suggested that the
proper course of procedure for defendant to follow is to move
the court for a continuance pending the determination of his
appeal.
United States v. Olsen" is the only case representing the opposite view. In that case Olsen was prosecuted in a federal district
court for smuggling alien Chinese laborers into the United
States. He pleaded in bar that the acts charged against him were
a part of a previous libel of information under which his ship
was forfeited, but he failed to allege that such judgment was still
in force and unreversed. A demurrer to this plea was sustained
because of failure to allege that such judgment was in full force
and effect and also on the ground that a judgment of forfeiture
cannot be pleaded by the owner in a subsequent prosecution
against him for the same offense. The district court pointed out
that if it were shown that an appeal from a former conviction
of the same offense were pending at the time of a subsequent
prosecution therefor, it would protect the defendant from a second prosecution. This is put upon the ground that the former
judgment is voidable only, and while it stands unreversed it is
final as to matters therein decided.
It would seem that the latter is the more desirable rule. If
the first conviction should be affirmed, then, presumably, the
second prosecution will have served no end other than to waste
the state's time and money. If it should be reversed and remanded, it would raise the question whether still another trial in
accordance with the decision of the reviewing court would be
necessary. Finally, it does appear that the conviction and judgment, while unreversed, are conclusive as to the things therein
adjudged.
B. P. MORISSETTE
DIVORCE-JURISDICTION--RIGHT OF WIFE TO ACQUIRE SEPARATE

the case of
Burkhardt v. Burkhardt,' a Delaware court was confronted with
the following facts: The Burkhardts were living in Germany in
1925, and finding living conditions unbearable, Mr. Burkhardt
DOMICILE WHEN LIVING APART WITH CONSENT.-In

5 See 14
is reversed
6 Supra,
1 193 A.

CHIcAGo-KENT REVIEW 156, to effect that if the former conviction
no jeopardy exists.
footnote 4.
924 (Del., 1937).
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decided to send his wife to America with two of their three
children. If the wife found conditions in America favorable he
was to follow. She arrived here in 1925, and from that time he
contributed nothing to the support of his family. In 1930 she
visited Germany, bought a ticket to America, which she left for
her husband, and returned to her home in Delaware. He, however, never followed her, and her divorce on the ground of
desertion ensued. The question was whether the wife, on these
facts, had established a separate domicile so as to enable her to
file a suit for divorce.
The court held that because the wife had come to America with
the consent of her husband and lived here since 1925, her home,
if anywhere, was in America, and the husband's subsequent
refusal to come could not disestablish her domicile in Delaware,
and remand her to the old domicile in Germany. 2 Rather, his
refusal to come would initiate a ground for divorce which would
be recognized even in Germany.3
In England, the old common law rule that the domicile of the
wife during coverture is always that of the husband is strictly
followed.4 This rule is also followed in the United States prior
to a marital breach. 5 In line with the trend toward removal of
the disabilities of married women there has developed in this
country a tendency to recognize the married woman's right to
establish a separate domicile after marital misconduct of the
husband. The earlier cases held that where the husband abandoned the wife she could not acquire a new domicile but could
bring suit for divorce at the last domicile where she lived with
her husband. 6 The courts then tended to hold that where the
husband was the offending party, the wife could leave him and
2 The court relied upon Jansen v. Jansen, 160 Ga. 618, 128 S. E. 902
(1925), where the wife had taken up her residence in accordance with her
husband's direction but was unable to return to him because of his failure to
furnish transportation, and Saperstone v. Saperstone, 131 N. Y. S. 241
(1911), where a wife had left her home in Europe to come to America with
the intention of making it her permanent home, and husband had not been
permitted to emigrate because of disease.
3 Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. V,. 177-184.
4 Stumberg, Conflict of Laws (The Foundation Press, Inc., Chicago, 1st
Ed.), 39; Beale, Conflict of Laws (Baker, Voorhis & Co. New York, 1st
Ed.), 1, 198; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (West Publ. Co., St. Paul, 1st Ed.),
sec. 32; Blackstone's Commentaries (Robert H. Small, Phil., 1825, 4th Ed.),
I, 442.
5 Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155, 45 L. Ed. 794 (1901) ; Anderson v.
Blakesly, 155 Iowa 430, 136 N. W. 210 (1912) ; Blankenship v. Hall, 233 Ill.

116, 84 N. E. 192 (1908) ; Dicey, Law of Domicile (Stevens & Sons, London, 1st Ed.), 104.
6 Harteau v. Harteau, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 181 (1833); Hick v. Hick, 5
Bush (Ky.) 670 (1869).
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acquire a mere residence for the purpose of suit.7 Lately the
rule has been so extended that many of our states recognize the
right of the wife, where the husband is the offender, to separate
from him and establish her own domicile for all purposes.8
The decisions in Illinois follow the same general pattern, first
holding that the wife's domicile followed that of the husband, 9
then that his misconduct entitled her to establish a separate residence, 10 and lastly, allowing her, upon her husband's misconduct,
to select a separate domicile at any place she chooses." Farther
than this the Illinois courts have not yet gone. There have been
no decisions to date that a wife may obtain a separate domicile
by mutual agreement
with her husband, nor that she can do so
12
for her own offense.
The instant case differs from the usual one, because the original
separation was friendly and with the consent of both parties.
Were this the only fact in the case, the decision would have been
quite novel, for it would authorize married persons to have
separate domiciles. However, the husband's subsequent refusal
to come here was deemed such an offense as would entitle her
to consider the marriage broken' 8 and, following the authorities referred to, would enable her to establish a new domicile if
she so desired. The unique effect of the application of such a
doctrine to this case, however, is to convert what was merely a
residence in this country into an actual domicile without any7 Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 108 (1870); Re Wickes, 128 Cal.
270, 60 P. 867, 49 L. R. A. 138 (1900) ; Clark v. Clark, 191 Mass. 128, 77
N. E. 702 (1906).
8 Williamson v. Ostenton, 232 U. S. 619, 58 L. Ed. 758 (1913) ; Barber v.
Barber, 21 How. 582, 16 L. Ed. 226 (1858) ; McPherson v. Housel, 13 N. J.
Eq. 35, (1860) ; McKay v. McKay, 192 Mo. App. 221, 182 S. W. 124 (1915);
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 S. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867 (1906)
Moffatt v. Moffatt, 5 Cal. 281 (1855).
9 Ashbaugh v. Ashbaugh, 17 Ill. 476 (1856) ; Phillips et al. v. Springfield,
39 Ill. 83 (1866); Davis v. Davis, 30 11. 180 (1863) ; Kennedy v. Kennedy,
87 Ill. 250 (1877) ; Cooper v. Beers, 143 Ill. 25, 33 N. E. 61 (1892) ; Kenley
v. Hudelson, 99 Ill. 493 (1881).
10 Derby v. Derby, 14 Ill. App. 645 (1884); Chapman v. Chapman, 129
Ill. 386, 21 N. E. 806 (1889); In re Dunning, 211 Ill. App. 633 (1918).
11 Thorns v. Thorns, 222 Ill. App. 618 (1921).
12 It would seem as though the delinquent wife may not set up a separate
domicile, Dutcher v. Dutcher, 39 Wis. 651 (1876); but contra, Prater v.
Prater, 87 Tenn. 78, 9 S. W. 361 (1888) ; Watertown v. Greaves, 112 F.
183 (1901) ; In re Florance's Will, 7 N. Y. S. 578 (1889).
Is It may be that the court considered the husband's refusal to come to this
country as a refusal to cohabit with his wife anywhere, since there was no
request made by him that she return to Germany. Query, whether the court
would have held the same way if the husband had offered to support his wife
at his domicile in Germany.
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thing more being necessary than the husband's marital misconduct in a foreign land.
G. KLOEK
EVIDENCE-DEGREE OF PROOF-PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
AS SUFFICIENT IN CIVIL CASE TO PROVE THIRD PARTY GUILTY OF

CRIME.-In Schultz v. Royal Neighbors of America,' the Appellate Court of Illinois held that where, in a civil case, a third
party is charged with commission of a crime, the burden of
proof is discharged by a preponderance of the evidence. Plaintiff
sued defendant as beneficiary under a policy of insurance. The
defense was that the insured had been killed during the commission of a burglary. The court said, "We think the [trial] court
was in error in requiring the defendant to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the insured was involved in the crime.... "
The law in Illinois is that where a party to a civil case is
charged with a crime, the allegation must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.2 Exceptions are cases of slander and libel,3
and crimes that are only misdemeanors. 4 The rule requiring
proof beyond a reasonable doubt rose in England, because
"....

where a defendant justifies words which amount to a charge

of felony, and proves his justification, the plaintiff may be put
upon his trial without the intervention of a grand jury." 5 That
reason has been abolished in England, and never existed in this
country; and the rule has been abandoned in most states. However, it has been retained in Illinois and a few other statesA
Wigmore says, "Policy suggests that the latter test [proof beyond a reasonable doubt] should be strictly confined to its
original field, and that there ought to be no attempt to employ
it in any civil case.' '7
In any event, proof by a preponderance is all that is required
where the charge of crime is against a third party. As was said
in Foster v. Graf,8 "There is no good reason for holding that
1 291 Ill. App. 176, 9 N. E. (2d)

435 (1937).
2 Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Klewer, 129 Ill. 599, 22 N. E. 489 (1889);
McInturff v. Insurance Co. of N. A., 248 Ill. 92, 93 N. E. 369 (1910) ; Oliver
v. Ross, 289 111. 624, 124 N. E. 800 (1919) ; Rost v. Noble & Co., 316 Ill. 357,
147 N. E. 258 (1925).
3 Ill. Rev. Stat., 1937, Ch. 126.
4 Rost v. F. H. Noble & Co., 316 Ill. 357, 147 N. E. 258 (1925).
5 Cook v. Field, 3 Esp. 133, 170 Eng. Rep. 564 (1788).
6 See cases collected in 23 C. J. 14, 16.
7 Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed., 1923), V, 473, sec. 2498 (2).
8 287 Ill.
559, 122 N. E. 845 (1919). Accord, see Waggoner v. Clark, 293
Ill. 256, 127 N. E. 436 (1920); Wilson Grocery Co. v. National Surety Co.,
218 Ill. App. 584 (1920).
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the criminal charge against a stranger to the suit must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. He is in no way bound by the judgment in such a case."
R. ROE
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS -

COMMISSIONS -

WHETHER

EXECUTOR'S COMMISSION IS TO BE COMPUTED ON VALUE OF
ESTATE AT DATE OF DEATH OR DATE OF DISTRmUTION.-The

question of administrator or executor's fees even though usually
regulated in some manner by statute has always presented a difficulty to both the lawyer and to the courts. The problem was
treated in the recent case of Lewis et al. v. Bowers' decided by
the Federal District Court of New York. The action was brought
to recover an alleged overpayment of an estate tax imposed by
the Federal Government. The plaintiffs, the executors of an
estate, *claimedthat the Commissioner in computing the net taxable estate had allowed too small a deduction for executor's commission.
The decedent had died a resident of New York, on December
14, 1919. The estate was a large one and distribution had not
been made until about June, 1927. Although no formal accounting had been rendered and no award of executor's commissions
had been made by the Surrogate's Court, the executors had paid
to one of their number the sum of $169,477.98 as commissions
which they claimed was the proper deduction from the gross
estate in computing the estate tax. The commissioner had allowed
only the sum of $64,403.69.
The difference was caused by the fact that the commissioner
had calculated the commissions by taking the value of the estate
at the date of death and applying the rates then in force in
New York, while the executors had arrived at theirs by applying
the higher scale of commission fixed by law, which took effect
in 1923, first, to the income of the estate received by them in the
course of administration, and secondly, on the value of the property of the estate at the time of distribution, the estate having
increased greatly in value.
The court disallowed the portion of the claim covered by the
tax on income saying that commissions on income are calculated
separately and are not part of the administrator's expenses
chargeable to the corpus of the estate but are chargeable only
against income and therefore might be a proper deduction for
income tax purposes but was not a proper one for purposes of
1 19 F. Supp. 745 (1937).
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the estate tax. However, it held that the other deductions were
proper as the revenue law of 19182 permitted the deductions of
such amounts "as are allowed by the laws of jurisdiction whether
within or without the United States, under which the estate is
being administered." The court pointed out that under the laws
of New York3 an executor is entitled to commissions on any increase of value in an estate and the executors' commissions are
computed on the rates prevailing when the account is settled,
even though other rates were in existence at the decedent's
death.
Although the rule as thus laid down seems to be definite, it
may be open to question where conditions were reversed and the
rates were smaller or the value of the estate at the time of
4
settlement was much smaller than it was at the time of death.
In view of the economic changes during the past several years
the decision is particularly interesting to Illinois practitioners
because of the holding that the commissions were properly
figured on the value of the estate at the time of distribution.
This matter has seldom reached the reviewing courts of this
country and does not seem to have been touched in Illinois, perhaps partly because of the discretionary power of the courts
given by the statute which reads, "Executors and administrators
shall be allowed as compensation for their services a sum not
exceeding six per centum on the money arising from the sale
of real estate, with such additional allowances for costs and
charges in collecting and defending the claims of the estate and
disposing of the same as shall be reasonable."
While the provision just quoted does not place the payment of
commissions on a strict arithmetical formula, the practice of
many courts is so to base it in its allowance of administrators' or
executors' fees, and even at times of attorneys' fees, so it may
therefore be well to keep the decision in mind.
C. E. HACKLANDER

Section 403 (a) (1), 40 Stat., 1098.
In re Richardson's Will, 293 N. Y. S. 758 (1937); In re Hawley's
Estate, 253 N. Y. S. 820 (1927) ; and In re Barker, 230 N. Y. 364, 130
N. E. 579 (1921), were cases cited by the court to support its statement.
4 In In re Hagerty's Estate, 97 Wash. 491, 166 P. 1139 (1917), the court
held that if the appraised value is greater than the value at the time of
settlement the latter controls in fixing compensation; In Priewe v. Priewe,
43 N. D. 509, 175 N. W. 732 (1919), the court held that commissions on real
2
3

estate not sold were to be figured on the original inventory and appraisement
and not on the present value, but here the Administrator had in the interim
received and accounted for rents for over 20 years.
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NAMES--CHANGE-WHAT

Is NECESSARY FOR JUDICIAL SANCTION

OF CHANGE OF NAME.-In the recent case of Petition of Cohen1
the City Court of New York denied a petition to change the
name of the petitioner, Morris Cohen, to that of Louis Murray
Kagan. The petitioner urged as a reason for his contemplated
change of name the fact that his name Morris Cohen was a very
common one and occurred with great frequency in the telephone
directory and further that the new name would materially aid
the petitioner in his contemplated practice of podiatry. The
court held such reasons to be insufficient for the granting of the
petition.
The New York statute of 18472 provided that if the officers to
whom such petition was presented were satisfied that a pecuniary
benefit would result to the petitioner from such a name change
such change should be ordered. In 1859 the court of Common
Pleas of New York in the Petition of John Snook 3 held that
under this act the judge hearing a petition for a change of
name had to be able to say, judicially, from the evidence presented that the applicant would derive a pecuniary benefit by
assuming another name and that the mere possibility or probability that such would be the result was not sufficient.
In March of 1860 the power of the court was materially
enlarged to read, "If the court to whom such application shall
be made, shall be satisfied by such petition, so verified, or by
affidavits presented, that there is no reasonable objection that
such person should assume another name, such court shall make
an order authorizing such applicant to assume such name. "4
This statute was interpreted in the decision of the New York
Superior Court in In re Slobody, 5 wherein the court stated that
as a general rule an application for a change of name should be
granted by the court. Though this law has been amended since
1860, the clause "that there is no reasonable objection" appears
1 297 N. Y. S. 905 (1936).
2 Laws of New York, 1847, Ch. 464, § 3.
3 2 Hilt. (N. Y. Com. Pleas) 567 (1859).
4 Laws of New York, 1847, Ch. 464, § 3, as amended, Laws of New York,
Mar. 17, 1860, p. 125. The same language is used in fuller form in L. 1920
Ch. 924, Apr. 15, 1921; Cahill's Cons. Laws of N. Y. (1930), Ch. 7, par. 63.
However in 1878 the New York Common Pleas court, apparently overlooking
the revision of the statute, held that "A person cannot have his name
changed by application to a court under (3 R. S., 6th edition, p. 866) unless
his petition shows that a pecuniary benefit will result to petitioner from the
change of name." Matter of Ludwig And, 1 Monthly Law Bulletin 14,
(N. Y. Common Pleas, 1878).
5 173 N. Y. S. 514 (1918).
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in the latest enactment. 6 The statute of Illinois 7 is in substantial
conformity with the present New York law, but apparently
never has been interpreted. Statutes in other jurisdictions, although slightly different in form, have been construed in much
the same fashion as that of New York. For example, that of
California s was interpreted in the case of In re Ross 9 where the
court said that it "should normally make its decree recording
such change of name" but that the court has discretion to deny
the application though "some substantial reason must exist for
the denial." Nebraska has likewise held in the case of In re
Taminosian'0 that under their statute requiring sufficient and
reasonable cause to be given for a change of name, a decree is
not a matter of right but of judicial discretion.
A question arises whether or not the presence of such statutes
eliminates the common-law right to change one's name. The
Illinois case of Reinken v. Reinken," the only one found dealing
with the right, declares that "statutory provisions permitting an
individual to apply to court for an order changing his (or her)
name, are merely permissive, and do not abrogate the commonlaw right to change name without such application." A similar
holding exists in the New York case of In re Burstein.12 The
Pennsylvania court in the case of Laflin and Rand Powder Company v. Steytler 18 also stated that the statutory mode of changing
one's name was in affirmance and aid of the common law and did
not destroy the common-law right to make such change. The
common-law right to make such change, however, must be exer14
cised bona fide and not for a fraudulent purpose.
It has been intimated in the New York cases of Smith v. U. S.
Casualty Company15 and In re Burstein that where resort has
been had to the statutory proceeding, the applicant shall be
known by the new name and no other, and that after such new
name has been acquired by judicial decree the petitioner cannot
6 Cahill's Cons. Laws of N. Y. (1930), Ch.7,par. 63.

Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 96, § 1.
8 Cal. Code of Civ. Proc., par. 1278.
9 67 P. (2d) 94 (Cal., 1937).
10 97 Neb. 514, 150 N. W. 824 (1915).
11 351 Ill. 409, 184 N. E. 639 (1933).
12 124 N. Y. S. 989 (1910).
The petitioner therein averred that he was
known under the changed name to his friends and acquaintances and as a
result his petition was dismissed, the court holding there was no necessity
for an order.
18 146 Pa. St. 434, 23 A. 215 (1892).
14 In re Burstein, 124 N. Y. S. 989 (1910) ; In re Slobody, 173 N. Y. S.
514 (1918) ; Linton v.First Nat. Bank of Kittanning, 10 F.894 (1882) ; 18
Ann. Cas. 701; 45 C.J.381.
15 197 N. Y. 420, 90 N. E. 947 (1910).
7
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acquire another without resorting to the courts. Although the
petitioner, Morris Cohen, is not deprived of his right to assume
the name of Kagan, his common-law right not being abrogated,
it would appear that the action of .the New York court in denying the petition of Morris Cohen was erroneous, and that in fact
no reasonable objection did appear why Morris Cohen should
6
not assume his new name.'
W. J. DAvis
REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS--PARTIES--RIGHT
PERSON

AS THIRD

PARTY

BENEFICIARY

TO

OF INJURED

SUE FOR REFORMA-

INSURANCE POLICY.-In Hunt v. Century Indemnity
Company' the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that under
an automobile liability policy of insurance providing for direct
liability of the insurer to the injured person after return, not
satisfied, of execution against the insured, the injured person
could maintain a bill in equity for the reformation of the insurance contract on the ground of mutual mistake between the
insurer and the insured. There is no novelty as to direct liability
of the insurer to the injured person, but there are few decisions
permitting reformation.
In this case, through failure of the agent of defendant insurer
to inquire into the title to insured's car, a policy of insurance
was issued which stated that the "named assured has complete
ownership of all disclosed automobiles-except as herein stated"
with "No exceptions." The insured did not in fact have complete ownership.
Following issuance of this policy the present complainant was
injured while riding as a passenger in the car of the insured,
sued the latter and secured judgment in the amount of five thousand dollars. Upon execution being returned unsatisfied the injured person brought an action at law directly against the
insurance company. This right was necessarily given in the
policy by virtue of the general laws of Rhode Island, by which an
injured person holding an unsatisfied judgment against the insured may then proceed against the insurer.
In the action at law the defendant insurer sought to escape
liability by contending that the insured did not have complete
TION OF

16 Problems also arise concerning the power to prevent a person from
making a change of name, and the desirability of legislation limiting or further regulating promiscuous name changing. See Minor Bronaugh, "Names,"
33 Law Notes 85 (1929) and Frederick Dwight, "Proper Names," 20 Yale

L. J. 387 (1911).
1 192 A. 799 (R. I., 1937).
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ownership of the car. The plaintiff then moved that the case
be passed until the policy could be reformed to express the true
intent of the original parties. Upon the motion's being granted,
the present bill in equity was filed by the injured person. The
insured was joined with his consent.
In sustaining the bill, the court held that under the policy
written in the form required by the statute2 the injured person
stands in the same relationship to the insurer as the beneficiary
under a life insurance policy, whose right to sue or reform is
not dependent upon statute but upon the policy contract.
The right of the injured person to secure reformation of this
contract rests upon his being subrogated to the rights of the
insured. The statute required the policy to be written containing provisions for such subrogation. The subrogation places the
injured person in privity with the insured with equal rights in
so far as the protection features of the policy are concerned and
subject to any conditions or limitations which would be good
against the insured.
At common law and in the absence of statute an injured person acquired no rights against an insurer under an indemnity
policy unless there was an express provision for payment to the
injured person or unless from a reasonable construction it could
be considered a policy of insurance rather than of indemnity. At
the present time statutes in a majority of states provide for
direct liability of the insurer to the injured person and permit
the latter to sue the former where a judgment has been taken
against the insured and is unsatisfied. Such statutes have made
unnecessary, as a condition precedent to recovery against the
insurer, the payment of the judgment by the insured. a
In general to entitle a party to the reformation of a written
instrument it must appear that the complainant is a party to or4
privy to the transaction and has a substantial interest therein.
Similarly a court of equity will interfere not only as between
original parties but also as to those claiming under them, if they
be in privity. 5
Some little difficulty arises when an attempt is made to deGeneral Laws of Rhode Island, Ch. 258, § 7.
3 Guerin v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 107 Conn. 649, 142 A. 268 (1928)
Williams v. Nelson, 228 Mass. 191, 117 N. E. 189 (1917) ; Stacey v. Fidelity
& Casualty Co., 114 Ohio St. 633, 151 N. E. 718 (1926).
4 Butler v. Barnes, 60 Conn. 170, 21 A. 419 (1891); Allen v. Elder &
Son, 76 Ga. 674, 2 Am. St. Rep. 63 (1886); White v. Wilson, 6 Blackf.
(Ind.) 448, 39 Am. Dec., 437 (1843).
5 Security Savings & Trust Co. v. Portland Flour Mills Co., 124 Or. 276,
261 P. 432 (1927); Adams v. Baker, 24 Nev. 162, 51 P. 252 (1897).
2
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termine what type of privity is needed in order to entitle the one
claiming privity to a reformation. In some jurisdictions this is
taken to mean technical privity. 6 In others it is said that the
necessary privity arises when the one suing has succeeded to the
interest of the original party against whose interest such mistake
operates. 7 In the case of Binswanger v. Employers Liability As8
surance Corporation
the Missouri Court of Appeals held that a
pedestrian negligently injured on a sidewalk before insured's
premises was in privity with the insured authorizing an action on
an indemnity policy as a third party beneficiary, and could sue
to reform the policy for mistake regarding the insured's name.
As in the instant case, this policy expressly provided that the
injured party might sue the insurer.
In the case of Tuzinska v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Company, Limited9 the injured person was permitted to reform the
policy, the court holding that "when an insurance contract is
entered into which is affected by the section, 10 the contract, so far
as a right of action is concerned, gives' to dny person in the world
who may be injured by the insured, a status equivalent to privity
with the insured, places him in a position analogous to that of
the third party beneficiary discussed in Lawrence v. Fox."
In the case of Flanagan v. Harder et al.'2 it was held that,
under the Michigan statute providing for direct liability of the
insurer to the injured person, such injured person has a substantial interest in the owner's liability policy and is entitled to
have the policy reformed to cover the automobile causing injuries, particularly where the insurer attempts to deprive the
complainant of his legal rights by means of a fraudulent release
and the automobile owner is insolvent. 13
Under statutes providing for direct liability of the insurer to
the injured person, the latter is a third party beneficiary. There
6 Garlington v. Blount, 146 Ga. 527, 91 S. E. 553 (1917).
7 Bank of Union v. Redwine, 171 N. C. 559, 88 S. E. 878 (1916).
8 224 Mo. App. 1025, 28 S. W. (2d) 448 (1930).
See also Uhrich v.
Globe Surety Co., 191 Mo. App. 111, 166 S. W. 845 (1914), where the
court stated, "A contract between two parties upon a valid consideration may
be enforced by a third party when entered into for his benefit. This is so
though such third party be not named in the contract, and though he was not
privy to the consideration. It is sufficient in order to create the necessary
privity that the promisee owe to the party to be benefited some obligation
or duty, legal or equitable, which would give him a just claim." This was an
action at law.
9 272 N. Y. S. 593 (1934).
10 Cahill's Consolidated Laws of New York (1930), Ch. 30, § 109.
11 20 N. Y. 268 (1859).
12 270 Mich. 288, 258 N. W. 633 (1935).
18 See Comp. Laws of Michigan (1929), § 12460.
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can be no question but that the insured owes a legal duty to avoid
negligent injury to a third person. By securing liability insurance, the insured seeks through the insurer to discharge this
legal duty, when it arises, by securing the insurer's promise to
14
pay this injured person.
A number of jurisdictions have held that to enable third party
beneficiaries to recover at law the element of privity is necessary,
and that such privity does exist when the intention of the contract is to confer a benefit on a third person. 15 A few jurisdictions find no privity and therefore deny a recovery at law.' 6
Where the court is willing to acknowledge privity, the decision should be consistent with the principal case. Conversely, if
an action at law cannot be maintained by the beneficiary due to
lack of privity as the court sees it, there is no basis for a resort
to equity.
The Rhode Island court's decision is sound and should be followed. Should the same question arise in Illinois, in view of the
statute of 193717 providing for direct liability of the insurer to
the injured person and in view of the attitude of the court in
this jurisdiction toward the rights of third party beneficiaries"8
the Supreme Court of Illinois may well arrive at the same conclusion as that reached in the instant case.
W. J. DAVIS
WITNESSES-COMPETENCY-WHETHER PLAINTIFF MUST ACCEPT
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT, WHO WAS ONLY EYE WITNESS TO
DEATH OF PLAINTIFF'S INTESTATE, BEFORE PROVING DECEASED'S

HABIT OF CAREFULNESS.-In the wrongful death action of Nordman v. Carlson' an unsuccessful attempt was made by the defendant to exclude the plaintiff's evidence of the careful habits of

the deceased by offering himself as the sole surviving eyewitness
of the accident. The death was caused by injuries inflicted on
14 See Samuel Williston, "Contracts for the Benefit of a Third Person,"
15 Harv. L. Rev. 767 (1902).
15 Ruohs v. Traders' Fire Insurance Co., 111 Tenn. 405, 78 S. W. 85
(1903). In the case of A. Rose & Son, Inc. v. Zurich General Accident &
Liability Co., 296 Pa. 206, 145 A. 813 (1929), the court said that "while
automobile liability insurance is of recent origin, we hold its beneficiary
clause is no different in legal effect from that of the ordinary life insurance
or mortgage insurance contract." This was an action at law.
16 See Armour v. Western Construction Company, 36 Wash. 529, 78 P.
1106 (1905); Mcllvane v. Big Stony Lumber Co., 105 Va. 613, 54 S. E.

473 (1906).
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 73, § 375a.
18 Lawrence v. Oglesby, 178 Ill. 122, 52 N. E. 945 (1899).
1 291 Ill. App. 438, 10 N. E. (2d) 53 (1937).
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the deceased by an automobile operated by the defendant. The
deceased's administratrix, in order to prove due care on the part
of the deceased, introduced evidence at the trial of deceased's
customary habits of carefulness. The defendant objected to the
admission of this evidence and on appeal assigns the admission
thereof as error on the ground that he was an eyewitness of
the accident and was available and had tendered himself to
the plaintiff as a witness.
In a previous case 2 the Illinois Supreme Court had held that
a defendant could not obtain the benefit of the rule prohibiting
evidence of habits of care on the part of the deceased where
there is an eyewitness, unless he first tender the name and
address of a witness competent to testify on the trial. Therefore,
the question raised in this case was whether or not the defendant was a competent witness under the Illinois statute$ governing the right of adverse parties in interest to testify in an action
brought or defended by an administrator. This statute provides:
"No party to any civil action, suit or proceeding, or person
directly interested in the event thereof, shall be allowed to
testify therein of his own motion, or in his own behalf ... when
any adverse party sues or defends as the ... administrator...
of any deceased person . . . unless when called as a witness by
such adverse party so suing or defending ... "4 In view of the
express language of this statute that the defendant in this case
would not be competent to testify unless called by the administratrix, it does not appear wherein the court's decision, that the
defendant's statutory disqualification remained and that the
plaintiff's evidence of due care was properly admitted by the
trial court, is open to question. 5 The decision is worthy of comment, however, because of the novelty of the defendant's attempt
to remove his statutory disqualification and because the decision
is suggestive of the proper procedure in other situations which
may arise under the statute.
2

Young v. Patrick, 323 Ill. 200, 153 N. E. 623 (1926).

3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 51, § 2.
4 The statute sets forth five exceptions to this disqualification, only one

of which applies to the principal case, or in any case, unless the administrator
has opened the door to testimony in behalf of his opponent by first introducing evidence in his own behalf as to conversations, transactions, admissions
or depositions of the deceased. The applicable exception permits the administrator's opponent to testify as to facts occurring after the death.
5 That the calling of the surviving defendant as an eyewitness by the
administrator would bar the administrator from introducing evidence of
deceased's careful habits is indicated, although not decided, in Scally v.
Flannery, 292 Ill. App. 349, 11 N. E. (2d) 123 at 125 (1937).
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For example, it has been held that a servant whose negligent
act caused an injury may testify on behalf of his master without
violating the statute if such servant is not a party to the suit, if
he will neither gain nor lose by the direct legal operation of the
judgment rendered therein, and if the record will not be legal
evidence either for or against him in some other action. The
mere existence of a right of action over by the master against
the servant does not make the servant incompetent.6 If the
servant is made a party to the action his testimony cannot be
received even though he offers to waive any benefit to himself
from such testimony.7 It would seem to follow, therefore, that
counsel for an executor or administrator in bringing an action
against two or more possible defendants should make all such
persons parties to the action, unless they are otherwise parties in
interest, if he would seek to establish his case either by the use
of circumstantial evidence such as the careful habits of the deceased or would silence parties who might otherwise testify on
behalf of his opponent.
H. H. SIMPSON, JR.

Feitl v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 211 Ill. 279, 71 N. E. 991 (1904).
7 Sullivan v. Corn Products Refining Co., 245 Ill. 9, 91 N. E. 643 (1910).
6

